26 February 2012
This blog will no longer be updated, but if you were a subscriber there is no need to switch your feed - I've done it for you already. I hope you all enjoy the new site.
For those who have links to this site on your websites, please update them to: http://www.struggleforever.com.
20 February 2012
Thanks to Mike Wesch for pointing me to this video, and for reminding me of the greatness of Alan Watts!
18 February 2012
I'm an advocate for what I would call "appropriate technology" in the classroom. Use what makes sense, and don't use it if it doesn't make sense. In other words, if you have to choose between some technological method and a non-technological method that works just as well, use the non-tech method. Technology often puts an unnecessary burden on teachers and students alike, often just adding to the work without really changing the nature of the class. If you're going to use technology, make sure it really makes a difference - if it doesn't, it's not worth it.
But more importantly, I think what makes a class and a teacher great is engagement with the students. In the past, I've referred to an "anthropological pedagogy." What I mean by that is that we apply the principles of anthropology and anthropological methods to the classroom experience. According to Tim Ingold, anthropologists, more than any other social scientists, "work with" people. That's what I think makes for good pedagogy.
It means recognizing the students as subjects - not merely as objects which must be filled with knowledge (this means not demeaning them or belittling them - even behind their backs as some grad students, and I'm sure faculty have a tendency to do). It means viewing the classroom as a space of mutual co-constitution - people (students and teachers alike) working together to construct a shared understanding. That doesn't mean that teachers should give up their leading role in the classroom - sometimes that's still the best way. It also doesn't mean that teachers should acquiesce to student's knowledge claims and accept them as equal to their own. It means listening and fostering healthy discussion so that knowledge can be shared and developed collaboratively.
There are no strict methods or rules of thumb that can bring this about. It requires teachers to be attentive, and reflexive - to adapt and continually attempt to improve. Really that's the key - if every professor did that, then college would be a much better place for everyone involved.
17 February 2012
I do not like Facebook - Google+ is better, but only moderately so - but it's where everyone is, and in the last few days I've realized the value of keeping connected to people no matter where or how that connection is maintained.
I'll be posting very much the same things on Facebook that I do on Google+, so it's up to you if you want to follow both of those accounts (or neither...). My initial sense is that I like the clean interface of Google+ and the content is more appealing, but the opportunities to connect and communicate are greater on Facebook. We'll see how it goes...
08 February 2012
Yesterday, I had an interesting discussion with a couple of my fellow Environmental Anthropology grad students about different theoretical approaches within the field. We had read chapter 3 from Arturo Escobar's book Territories of Difference - one which I have found very helpful in sorting out different theories of nature/culture. In this discussion, the three of us explored the different approaches listed, and tried to make some sense of how they relate to one another. I'll not go into Escobar's schematic - if you're interested, you can pick up the book or find one of the many articles Escobar has written on the subject. What I want to talk about instead is the practice of categorizing and arranging different theoretical approaches.
In my opinion, there is nothing wrong with trying to categorize theories. We do it all the time, and it is a helpful practice for those who are just learning or for those who are only trying to get a general sense of the field. Once we begin to delve deeper, and really try to understand the different theoretical approaches, however, the categories tend to get in the way. The reason, I think, is that categorization is the wrong method for trying to truly understand theory. Aside from a few iconic individuals and/or papers (i.e. Levi Strauss and structuralism, Steward and cultural ecology, etc.), the categories simply don't fit nicely. People borrow from a number of different theoretical frameworks, theories are misused or misunderstood, different people have different names for the same theory or the same name for different theories, and so on. It becomes just a jumbled mess of confusion. That's fine in practice - it seems to work much of the time - but for trying to make sense, it becomes very difficult.
The way I want to approach it - instead of viewing theories as categories into which we fit people and projects, we can understand theories as assemblages of practices that people can borrow from and utilize in different projects. A person will borrow certain ideas from Foucault, or Bourdieu in a project - these will not embody the whole of those theorists' thought, but only fragments which she then hangs together to form her overall practice (at least in this project). Even those theorists who are said to embody a particular theory will be doing the same. In this sense, a theoretical framework (structuralism, phenomenology, constructivism, actor-network theory, etc.) is really a heterogeneous mix of ideas and ways of thinking - not bounded and homogeneous as the categorization method assumes or suggests. Of course certain ideas fit well with one another, while others do not, so there is some sense of structure in that, but not in the sense of over-arching categories.
This is not to say that the categories don't matter. The categories are very real, and have a great effect. When you look up phenomenology in an encyclopedia or online, you'll no doubt see Hussrl and Heidegger listed as primary philosophers. You may see others listed as well. As a result, these categorizations tend to assemble certain people and ideas in a particular way. Without these categorizations, there may not be a "phenomenology" to speak of. So the categories themselves play a role in the assemblage of ideas.
I think this is a far more useful way of conceptualizing theory, though I know it is by no means the only way. Does anyone want to try to fit this theory of theory into a nice category of meta-theories? It's theories all the way down!
01 February 2012
There's been a lot of discussion lately about open access in academic anthropology publishing. See Savage Minds (here, here, and here), Neuroanthropology and Ethnografix for more details (sorry if I've missed any - feel free to leave links in the comments section). I wholeheartedly advocate for open access publishing - especially for anthropology. We are the one discipline that truly works with people (borrowing from Ingold). How can we honestly continue that tradition if our publications are hidden from view and locked behind university library system? I see no reason why open access journals can't be as high quality as their for-profit counterparts - in fact, it's certainly possible for them to be even higher quality if people are willing to put in the time and effort to make them so. I know that's the trouble, but it is possible, and if we value it, then we ought to do it.
As an up and coming academic, I'm willing to put my career on the line and promise to only publish in open access journals. Putting my career on the line is a very real threat, since many departments look for publications in key (generally not open access) journals such as American Anthropologist when hiring. However, I'm confident that the people who will be evaluating me will overlook those issues if they understand why I made this choice, and will evaluate my work on its own merits and not on the journal that publishes it. That said, I don't really know much about the OA landscape in anthropology journals. Right now, I have one article pending publication in Imponderabilia (which is OA), one in the works for O-Zone (which will be OA, but is not anthropology focused), and one on cultural resource management that I was considering submitting to Human Organization or Heritage and Society (neither of which are really open access), but if anyone knows of an OA journal I could submit to I'd be happy to reconsider.
21 January 2012
Adam has drawn two distinctions - the first between absolute and contingent withdrawal and the second between realism and materialism. Materialism, he argues, doesn't go far enough to account for the relationships between different entities (objects in the OOO language, but I prefer this term). He does this by arguing on the basis of epistemology - how one object can or cannot know another. I posed the question on one of Michael's posts if the problem of the gap between the object and knowledge of the object is not due to the fact that the object and the knowledge are ontologically distinct entities. This would mean that the two can never truly coincide with one another except, perhaps, by some process of intimacy. Adam calls this position materialism. He offers a different way of looking at it, which I had not thought of and which I now find myself grappling with. That is, that knowledge is not an entity unto itself, but rather a quality of objects attempting to relate to one another.
If the ontological character of relations is fundamentally about prehension — each entity’s unique enactment of an onto-specific world — then we do not have a split between “cognitive powers” and “powers of the flesh.” Rather we (humans) have something like enfleshed cognitive powers; a result of our embodied particularity’s engagement with the cosmos. In a sense then, epistemology is the onto-specific mode of translation each entity engages to enact its universe. Snails and bonobos have fleshy epistemologies just likes humans. Even stars might have some kind of episteme in this sense.At first I was tempted to turn the table on Adam and suggest that his is actually the materialist perspective and that Michael and I are the realists. For Michael and I, material objects and semiotic objects are equally real. They both have an ontological status of their own, and that the world is in fact heterogeneously composed of both material and semiotic entities.
On the other hand, Adam's position seems at first glance to reduce epistemology to a quality of objects - what then is left for the object to be? In a crude leap of logic what would be left is material, and so this would be a fundamentally materialist philosophy. But that's not what Adam is suggesting. Instead, the material and semiotic are both qualities of real objects, neither of which is foundational.
I'm inclined to suggest that both positions are realist and not materialist since neither posits matter as the ultimate ground of being even in the sense, as Levi Bryant has recently suggested, that "... all entities are materially embodied..."
I still prefer the approach that Michael outlines, and I look forward to reading his response to Adam's most recent posts as well as this one. However, I'm interested in what Adam is suggesting as it offers an alternative view that I hadn't considered - what would it mean for me? I'm not entirely sure yet, but I'm thinking about it.